Law in action, law in books: the practicality of medieval theft law by Ireland, Richard
Aberystwyth University








Citation for published version (APA):
Ireland, R. (2002). Law in action, law in books: the practicality of medieval theft law. Continuity and Change,
17(3), 309-331. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0268416003004417
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 30. Aug. 2021
Law in action, law in books:
the practicality of medieval theft law
RICHARD W. IRELAND*
ABSTRACT. This article approaches the medieval law of theft from a ‘ functional ’
perspective. It seeks, that is, to consider the rules of law principally in relation to the
social circumstances which give rise to them and upon which they, in turn, have an
impact. Concentrating primarily upon material from England and Wales, the essay
considers general issues of definition, jurisdiction and proof in the law of the middle
ages before concentrating specifically upon the rules respecting theft. The ideas of
manifest and non-manifest theft are explored in an attempt to discover why the law
distinguished between them. Potential difficulties concerning the bringing of theft
actions and the defences which might be offered to them are also examined and
related to the practical world in which perpetrators and victims of theft found
themselves. Finally, the possible tension between the satisfaction of the demands of
the individual victim and the wider desire to maintain public order is investigated.
It is easy to overlook the problems which a medieval law of theft had to
address. The essence of the offence, the taking of property belonging to
another, is simple to grasp, perhaps too simple. The historian may trawl
records, where they survive, for information about the incidence or demo-
graphic detail of this enduring offence, or seek telling details such as about
the type of property stolen. Yet the law itself and the procedures which
underpin it excite relatively little interest.1 Maitland’s observation relating
to the law of moveables, in the discussion of which he makes some of his
most perceptive comments concerning theft, is instructive. We have,
Maitland cautioned, ‘ too easily believed that the medieval law of chattels
was simple and straightforward and in all probability very like modern
law’.2 This comment seems as appropriate in respect of the law relating
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to the unlawful removal of goods as it is to the question of rights over
them – for clearly the one is the converse of the other.
Yet theft law is easy, isn’t it? It certainly seems to lend itself to relatively
concise definition. I recall very little of the law I read as a student, but the
definitions of theft which I learned, in respect of both the law of Rome
and of that which then pertained to England and Wales, still remain.
‘Furtum est contrectatio rei fraudulosa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus eius
possesionisve ’ :3 ‘A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates
property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriv-
ing the other of it ’.4 The eighth commandment receives no explanatory
gloss. Surely such a wrong, the essence of which can be conveyed even by
lawyers in a single sentence, requires little in the way of analysis.
Yet both the failure to define theft and the act of definition when it is
attempted present difficulties. The former approach, which simply names
the wrong without explaining it, is characteristic of the earlier English
secular law codes.5 It implies that either non-paradigmatic cases will not
occur or, if they do, will be appropriately resolved. That resolution, by
whatever means it is carried out,6 is a job within the law, but it is not a job
of the law. It will depend upon the particular facts of the individual case.7
The law provides the means of finding the answer rather than the answer
itself. Explicit legal definitions of offences, on the other hand, when they
do come to be given, are conclusions drawn from experience. They emerge
when lawyers8 attempt to hold the law, to give it form and substance,
rather than simply to do the job of settling particular disputes. They
flourish with the technology of writing which first serves custom and then
commands it.9 Even if they accurately encapsulate all the experience of
the past (in itself almost inevitably impossible) these definitions cannot
foresee the future. Difficult and unusual cases will still arise but lawyers
will now seek to solve them by looking to the written law. They will try
to find the answer by interpretation. The words, by which it was sought to
solve problems, will come to create them.10
Much medieval legal writing, certainly in England, concerns itself with
procedure rather than with definition. Whilst the emphasis on the form
rather than the substance of disputes may be overstated by legal historians
on occasion,11 it undoubtedly points to a great truth. Procedure was im-
portant. Our sources address the two issues crucial to the determination
of disputes, those of jurisdiction and of proof. Where and how the case
is to be settled are questions the answers to which explain much of what
we know of medieval law. These procedural questions become more
evident when written procedures are established and they develop as
‘ legal ’ questions in their own right. They may also prompt the authori-
tative definition of categories of substantive wrong, as, for example, when
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jurisdiction is disputed over a particular offence.12 The questions are old
ones, though. They must originally have been solved in accordance with
custom and/or pragmatism (if we can divide these concepts this easily)
from the earliest days of disputing in a public forum.
Even when legal rules are written down details of their role in main-
taining social order remain elusive. Even in our own day the rules of law
are only one element of the drama of dispute formulation and resolution,
and sometimes only the backdrop before which that drama is enacted.
Many crimes are unreported, many broken contracts unlitigated. Com-
pensation for road traffic accidents is generally settled by negotiations
between insurance companies, not by judicial process. Authority, gener-
ality and finance, all potent motivations for the incorporation of legal
material into written record, may be less pressing in relation to other
forms of regulation and settlement. Records may not have been created
or may not survive. Nor should we assume that the relationships between
the recorded and the unrecorded or between the legal and the extra-legal
remain constant. Attitudes towards law and its application, as well as
towards the recording of events in writing, change through time alongside
social conditions. That which once went unrecorded may begin to enter
the written evidence ; that which once was settled without the law moves
within it. Or (for we must be careful not simply to assume a unilinear
development) the pattern may be reversed.
Disputes arise not only between individuals but within communities.
This is an important point despite the difficulty that the concept of the
relevant ‘community’ itself is a complex and variable one. So, for example,
the identification of theft as an offence against ‘ the state ’ which we accept
today might be a less clearly recognized characteristic in other times. Yet
analysis of the characteristics of a community may help us to understand
the way in which it deals with its problems. Anthropologists have drawn
our attention to the linkage of certain types of dispute settlement with the
values and beliefs of the communities employing them.13 My own work
on the response to criminality in nineteenth-century Wales has convinced
me that we should view ‘ informal ’ resolutions even at that time less as
instances of deviation from a legal norm and more as assertions of a
different mentality, a different dominant normative framework.14 By this
I mean simply that we should look not only to the absence of law but
also to the presence of other social beliefs and structures which may ex-
plain it. A medieval world of small face-to-face communities, with com-
plex interrelations of loyalty and protection and a belief that judgement
in this world is only a simulacrum of the Real Thing to come in the next,
will not necessarily view its laws and their use in the same way as the
individual in the modern post-industrial state. All this is not to say
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that ‘ law’ and ‘state’ were unimportant in medieval society, it is to
suggest that their importance should be considered in an appropriate
context.15
My point is not only the familiar one that law is not the only means of
settling disputes. That much is obvious, yet not so obvious that it does
not need repetition. Rather it is important to see law as occupying a par-
ticular place amongst a range of possibilities. Let me give an example.
Both the early-medieval Welsh and English laws specify sums of com-
pensation to be paid in the event of wrongdoing. These tariffs, as has been
argued elsewhere,16 are not to be understood as a simple alternative to
feud, still less as a later mitigation of it. Feud and compensation are
necessarily interconnected – for the right to financial redress is an empty
one without a potent sanction to supplement it, while a society which has
no means of terminating interpersonal violence cannot, I suggest, survive
as a society at all.17 Yet I do not believe for one moment that – whatever
they might have come to mean18 and no matter how detailed and precise
they might be – the laws prescribing compensation payments had their
genesis as a sort of actuarial table or price list to determine the sum which
would inevitably be paid. It is true that I cannot prove this negative.
Yet there can seldom have been an arm broken in a fight, an illicit sexual
relationship or a sword taken from another without a context for that
fight, that embrace, that taking. The law, as we noted, tries to dam the
infinite variety of human experience behind the inadequate barrier of a
few words. Issues of intention, insult, provocation, affection and the rest
will all, I submit, determine the reaction to the wrong and the compen-
sation fixed upon if compensation is considered appropriate.19 What the
law offers (if indeed it offers anything of practical value at all rather than
being simply a symbolic totem of power20) is, to use Miller’s perceptive
image, a ‘default setting’21 – an authoritative external valuation if the
parties cannot agree their own, although it may well form an important
element in the arrival at that agreement.22 ‘ If you can’t sort it out yourself,
then this is what you’ll get ’ may be what such laws originally meant.23
Evidence of the use of compensation codes in cultures closer in time to
us than those we have been considering suggests that such an interpret-
ation is a possible one, though anthropological comparisons are of course
potentially dangerous.24
My view of how such codes operated in medieval society is based more
on beliefs about mentality than on specific evidence of social practice
which, though it has left us some records, may not have preserved that
which was regular and routine for many within society. Others with more
knowledge of the extra-legal sources may arrive at different conclusions,
but as one whose interest is in the social meanings and functions of law
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I maintain that the interpretation I have offered here is not only possible,
it is almost inevitable.
All of which leads me to my purpose in writing this piece, for so far
I have had some things to say about law, but very little about theft. My
aim is to explore this idea of social meaning and purpose against which
the law of theft may be read, to strip the legal texts in an attempt to
discover the practical themes which they may reveal. As such what follows
is by no means a detailed history of the law of theft. Nor, despite its con-
sideration of provisions from both England and Wales, is it intended to
be a comparative piece.25 I have instead simply tried to look at the types
of activity which the law of theft must regulate and the problems which
inhere in that regulation. That may seem to be a rather limited exercise.
It is also one which employs more than one perspective. In some in-
stances, such as in the discussion of manifest and non-manifest theft,
I have started with the legal regulations and tried to understand what it
was about the world that made them material. At other times, such as in
the discussion of the regulation of butchery, I have started at the other
end of the process, trying to imagine what would happen in practice and
then looking to see if the law made any intervention. The aims of this
article then may sound either absurdly reductivist or potentially preten-
tious, while its methodology invites accusations of naivety or confusion.
Nonetheless I believe that by considering the law alongside the activity
it seeks to regulate and the society in which it operates we may better
understand the relationship between the law and that society. What fol-
lows then may help us to grasp not narrowly what medieval theft law was,
but why it was so.
It is because of the particular approach adopted here that I feel happy
to commit what would be, in an orthodox doctrinal history of criminal
law, an unpardonable sin. I would not normally place the evidence of a
law of Aethelstan in the same sentence as a thirteenth-century eyre roll
case. In a piece which seeks to link law with cultural practice such a con-
junction might seem a fortiori misguided. Of course there were major
changes within the period surveyed in this article, and by no means the
least dramatic, in England at any rate, relate to the creation and adminis-
tration of law.26 Yet this article concentrates primarily on the underlying
social continuities around which legal rules and procedures are con-
structed. That there were such continuities will I hope become apparent.
I do not doubt, then, that the increase in penalties relating to thieves in the
laws of one king, or the changes in obligations to pursue them in the laws
of another, the replacement of ancient jurisdictions by a new model of
royal court, or of trial by ordeal by jury are all important matters. Yet
they are not the focus of this discussion. To this extent the essay is not
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an ‘historical ’ one, nor (to invoke the useful contrast drawn by Wormald)
do I see it as predominantly ‘ juristic ’.27 It is, for want of a better term,
functional. In 950 or 1350 a thief would look to dispose of or consume
stolen goods in a safe manner and the victim of theft would be obliged to
confront both the loss of goods which he would presumably rather still
have had and the wrong of the person who had removed them. I hope to
show in the analysis below, rather more clearly perhaps than in the ex-
planation offered above, why I feel it legitimate to regard the restrictions
of chronology and jurisdiction as permeable membranes in an exercise of
this nature.
THEFT, MAN IFE ST AND NON-MAN IFE ST
The distinction between the thief caught in the act and the suspect taken
in other circumstances is one familiar to those who have knowledge of
the texts of English, Welsh and, indeed, Roman law. Some procedural
differences in England continue to be noted in relation to the treatment
of the manifest thief for a considerable period of time, certainly well into
the thirteenth century.28 The greater punishment prescribed for the thief
caught in the act in some earlier English and some of the Welsh provisions
may seem prima facie to run counter to our expectation that a wrong
which is done secretly in small-scale societies is more socially divisive
than that which is overt. We know, for example, that killing by poison is
a graver offence than killing in a public brawl.29 What I wish to do here is
to examine not how the law treats the manifest thief differently from his
non-manifest counterpart, but why.
One argument which has been advanced by some of our most dis-
tinguished legal commentators is that the manifest thief is in the position
of an outlaw. Yet this is either no explanation at all or one which reverses
the process which we have considered earlier, whereby legal definitions
emerge as interim conclusions from customary behaviour. Let me explain.
To allow, as some of our early laws do, that a man taken in the act may
be summarily killed is, indeed, to treat him as an outlaw, for that is in
origin what the idea of outlawry means – the individual is put beyond the
protection of the law. But this is not to explain the phenomenon, merely
to restate it. On the other hand it may be that what is being advanced is
that the position of the manifest thief is in some way derived as a con-
clusion from some conceptual formulation of outlawry. Yet this would
seem improbable on two grounds. Firstly I would argue that such a con-
struction is logically doubtful. Why is manifest theft alone so treated?
To state the conlusion is still not to explain it. How does the automatically
outlawed thief magically become ‘ inlawed’ again by passage of time – for
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if he is not taken in the act his position will be the same as any other?
His status as outlaw or ‘ inlaw’ depends on the accident of discovery and
must move from one to the other if that discovery fails to occur. Secondly,
given the antiquity of the provisions relating to manifest offenders, the
idea that the concept of outlawry predates and explains the manifest
theft provisions seems historically improbable. The manifest thief and
the outlaw may both be in the same boat, but we still have no guidance
as to the reason for the former’s embarkation.
Retaliation would seem an obvious factor to explain why the manifest
thief is treated differently from others. In a society which is imbued with
ideas of honour and status (and we would expect the law to encode the
values of its elites before those of anyone else) the response considered
natural, indeed proper, to the man found driving off my cattle before my
very eyes, or indeed the man found sleeping with my wife, may not be to
consult my solicitor. To stay the hand is to bear the insult as well as the
loss and this, despite the entreaties of religion, may be too much to bear. If
revenge is the underlying explanation for the differential treatment of the
man taken in the act then we would expect to find it first as a defence to an
otherwise impermissible action. In England, at any rate, we do; the laws
of Ine and of Wihtraed in the seventh century protect a man who kills a
manifest thief from subsequent, otherwise legitimate, jeopardy. Surely,
then, this explanation is enough?30
I think not. If I have been away for a while and return to find that my
neighbour has taken my goods or indeed slept with my wife it is surely
the discovery of the wrong which makes the blood boil, not the precise
circumstances of that discovery. Perhaps, in practice, the man who kills
in that circumstance too will be regarded as having done so with justifi-
cation. But that is not what the laws say, and it is certainly not compat-
ible with the later formulations of the ‘manifest thief ’ doctrine which will
be discussed below. Neither of these is a compelling argument against the
proposition, but they do perhaps give some reason for further thought.
Surely we have to add into the explanation the crucial concept of proof
and the associated doctrine of jurisdiction. The importance of the taking
in the act is that the person so taken cannot deny his guilt. There is no case
to be proven, no need for a forum in which the proof need be rehearsed.
It really is as simple as this.31 Let us pursue these questions of proof and
jurisdiction further.
The rise, decline and precise nature of the jurisdictional privileges
relating to ‘handhaving’ thieves has been well investigated elsewhere.32
Clearly it is no surprise to find lords interested, physically or financially,
in the punishment of offenders, and the disciplining of their ‘own’ men
or the redress of wrongs on their own land would seem natural claims
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(or, from a royal point of view, concessions) until royal courts had both
the capacity and the authority to assert their pre-eminence in matters of
theft. Yet the apparent restriction to cases of the manifest offender which
Goebel finds in the early jurisdictional privilege of furis comprehensio
and which seems etymologically to underlie the later one of infangthief
deserves some mention.33 As Goebel points out, the right, indeed sub-
sequently the duty, to deal summarily with the thief taken in the act is a
common, not a lordly right.34 It devolves upon all and confers, in effect,
a universal ‘ jurisdiction’, not one which depends on lordship. Why then
is the same qualifying boundary imposed on the more specific jurisdic-
tional privilege which does depend upon lordship? The answer again lies
in the issue of proof. Here too the handhaving thief can be extracted
from the mass of complexity which can, as we shall see, make other thieves
so relatively difficult for the legal system. He stands out above them, ready
to be picked for a variety of purposes, because he is a factual premise, not
a legal conclusion.35
Such a state of affairs will not endure, given what we have seen about
the fundamental change in law which is wrought by its becoming an in-
tellectual discipline rooted in words rather than a practical job rooted in
action. I have argued elsewhere that the inability of the manifest thief to
deny his offence is originally a statement of a practical rather than a legal
disability. The medieval legal world is not, despite the caricatures which
still appear in print, one of blind irrational formulae. If you see someone
running out of your house with your cooking pot and chase them round
a corner to meet me, holding the pot, then other circumstances – whether
I am out of breath, known to be an honest man, able to explain myself –
will determine whether I am the clearly guilty man envisaged by the legal
provisions. I must be not only ‘handhaving’ but also a ‘thief ’. Yet ‘ law-
yers’ law ’ will seek to explain to us not simply what to do with the mani-
fest thief ; it will also try to tell us what these words mean. The creature
becomes conceptual rather than factual. When we look in the Welsh laws
we find the boundaries of the concept being explored. Is it enough to find
someone walking behind stolen cattle? Or with stolen goods in his house,
or thrown on the floor near to him? The late, professional Llyfr y Dam-
weiniau addressed these questions with, I feel, the air of a teacher raising
and answering a tutorial problem. There are, insofar as I am aware, no
parallel explanations in English Law, but the attempts to provide satis-
factory, uniform definitions for jurisdictional rights such as infangthief
may be evidence of a similar process of juridical development.36 The need
to proclaim these against an expansionist royal jurisdiction would pro-
vide the impetus for that process. The point, however, remains. The
manifest thief has a de facto existence before he has this de iure one.
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The idea of jurisdiction should make us aware of one further issue
specifically in relation to the English law of theft. That customary practice
might have varied in relation to the offence before standard formulations
were devised is evidenced in England by the passage in Glanvill where the
author declines to discuss theft because he is concerned only with actions
in the King’s Court, not with variant custom.37 What can be meant by
this statement? Insofar as it can be taken as suggesting that theft actions
are never heard by royal courts, it is clearly untrue. The author of the
earlier Dialogus de Scaccario knows that cases of theft could be heard
before royal justices,38 and the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton
are explicit on the point that thieves (though, as we shall see, this may
not mean the same as cases of theft) may be dealt with by royal com-
missioners. Moreover even the author of Glanvill himself, in his discussion
of the procedure of voucher to warranty, seems fully aware of the fact that
royal jurisdiction may be invoked.39 What the author must be telling us
is no more than that there was in the reign of Henry II no feeling that the
King’s Court was exclusively, or even normally, the place for determi-
nation of cases of theft. Despite the tough words of the Assizes it would
have been impossible for this most prevalent of offences to have been
dealt with by the king’s justices alone. Nor indeed would that be necess-
arily desirable. For theft has elements of both a private (that is, to the
victim) and a public wrong (that is, to the community, however that be
defined, including to the king as representing the ‘state ’). A jurisdictional
allocation which privileged only the public aspect might not be acceptable.
For in not every case may the offence to the respective injured interests
be identically construed. There may be instances where the individual
victim’s satisfaction may be felt to be more important than the public
vindication of property rights. To such a possibility we will return in a
while.
THE NON-MAN IFEST TH IEF
So far we have concentrated on ‘easy’ incidences of theft, where the stolen
property is taken with the offender. What of the more difficult cases where
it is not? From the victim’s perspective the first resort may be to seek
to pursue the property. References in Anglo-Saxon law show the import-
ance of following the trail of livestock which have gone missing. Under
Aethelstan the communal obligation of this task is stressed, as too is
the presumptive probative power of a trail which leads onto another’s
land but not off it again.40 It is not surprising to find references to such an
eminently practical response to theft within the legal sources. Property
other than livestock could not generally be pursued in this way, however.
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Physical evidence of the movement of inanimate property might be less
easy to come across. So just as, in the trial by ordeal, the legal system
involved supernatural agency when human powers were incapable of re-
solving a difficulty, so too did victims of crime. Such latter matters are,
by their nature, less susceptible to legal regulation, for they require no
secular forum nor any jurisdictional procedure. ‘Thief magic ’ could be
employed to discover the location of goods, the identity of the taker, or
both. In late-medieval Norfolk we know that a magic formula inscribed
on a wax tablet might reveal a thief ’s identity in a dream if the victim
slept with it beneath his head.41 Indeed a charm to ward off theft before
it happened might take its place alongside the more earthly precautions
of earmarking beasts42 and maintenance of frankpledge as evidence that
prevention was better than cure.
If a theft had been accomplished, however, the offender too might have
his own problems. In centres of population the disposal of stolen goods
might be more easily accomplished or alternatively the network of trav-
ellers who communicated with those centres might be employed.43 In more
static rural communities in an age when life was lived in public the thief ’s
enjoyment of the profits of his actions might not have been a simple
matter. Theft of livestock, a lucrative offence in the middle ages, needs
some thought if the profits of the crime are to be enjoyed. I cannot simply
place my neighbour’s sheep in my field and hope that no-one notices. If
the animals come from a distance I may be able to produce a reason for
having them, even if that reason depends on a degree of generosity by
another.44 I might try to conceal cattle in my house, though presumably
not indefinitely.45 Disguise might be possible – a case from 1347 shows the
white horns of cattle being burned46 – but hardly reliable. A more satis-
factory method of changing livestock would be to transform them into
money or goods. It is then no surprise to find regulation of cattle sales
appearing in English law.47 A final option open to the thief would be to
butcher the stock. Again the Anglo-Saxon corpus of theft legislation at-
tempts to address this possibility directly, a law of Aethelred instructing
that sheep and cows should be killed before witnesses and the hide and
head retained for three days.48 A case from the fourteenth century proves
how efficacious the remains of a slaughtered beast might be in determining
its provenance.49
If the problem of tracing stolen goods is one familiar to the modern
reader the next problem which the medieval victim of crime may have
had to confront is, outside certain subcultural groupings, one which is
less apparent in the present day. Consider the case, then, where I have
indeed placed your sheep in my field but I have simply too much power –
economic, social or merely physical – to be perturbed by your knowledge
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of the fact. The simple observation of Davies and Fouracre that ‘early
medieval institutions were difficult to use against the strong’50 is perhaps
insufficiently acknowledged in an age such as our own when, at least in
theory, the idea of equality before the law is axiomatic. Yet with the onus
generally cast upon the victim to seek legal redress, the practical diffi-
culties of raising the head above the parapet might outweigh any theoreti-
cal legal issues. InWelsh law the timorous victim is provided with a specific
mechanism of interposing both the power of the lord and the presumed
objectivity of the church between himself and the man he accuses.51
Aethelstan’s laws directly address the question of the intimidating plaintiff
in England.52 A further tradition which might offer some consolation to
the victim in England (though we should not, I think, overstate its effi-
cacy) is the alternative to individual prosecution in the form of communal
presentment of crime.
As to the origin, as opposed to the function, of the presenting jury
I propose to add nothing, for enough debate has taken place on this sub-
ject.53 Suffice it to say, then, that there seems to have been nothing new
in the idea of communal prosecution of crime when Henry II employed
it in the Assizes of Clarendon and Northampton. Indeed from the func-
tionalist perspective adopted in this article innovation looks to be less
likely than it might appear in one which starts from textual references
alone. When, for reasons of policy, money, or ideology, the ‘state ’ begins
to take a serious interest in crime it will soon become aware of the in-
herent limitations of allowing prosecutions to remain entirely at the dis-
cretion of private individuals.54 Yet Henry’s reforms are important. Theft
thereafter becomes an established matter for royal court jurisdiction even
if the victim fails to prosecute in person. Yet, and this is perhaps the point
of Glanvill ’s jurisdictional observation, it would be impossible for the
king’s justices to determine every case of theft in which no individual
prosecutor appeared. If the Assize of Clarendon began as a one-off sup-
pression of disorder then its reference to thieves may have an implied
application to those who had committed not a single act of theft but who
were considered to be generally dishonest.55 Whether this is true or not
we may acknowledge that the tension between treating theft as a wrong
against an individual and as a wrong against the social body, whilst by no
means created by Angevin legal reforms, is nonetheless exemplified by
them. If the law is serious about theft as an offence against more than
simply the individual then it will of necessity have to make provision for
dealing with, amongst others, the intimidating offender.
Let us return, however, to our victim of an individual theft. In the pre-
ceding discussion we have considered the case where a defendant is found
but is contemptuous of legal process. There must have been many cases,
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however, where the defendant was willing to defend himself in the legal
arena and did so by claiming that he had a better right to the goods than
the prosecutor. Whilst many claims of this kind might be lost behind the
‘general issue’, tested by battle or ordeal or the verdict of a jury, we would
expect to find reference to common formulae of claims of better right
and our legal sources do indeed reflect some of these arguments. Let us
deal with them in turn.
‘It is not yours, it has always been mine’ may be the accused’s claim. In
relation to coins or coats or axes it might be difficult to invoke particular
connections rather than simply to appeal to common knowledge to link
the owner to the goods. With livestock, however, there is an extra possi-
bility. Medieval man might not understand fingerprints but he could
understand pedigree. It is not surprising then that in both Welsh laws
relating to animal pleas and in Bracton’s discussion of answers to an ap-
peal of larceny the defence of birth and rearing appears first.56 Yet it
may do so not because of its frequency of use but simply because pleas of
this kind will settle an easy sort of argument: the defendant establishes
his right from the creation of the goods allegedly stolen. Of course there
may still be difficulties of proof, but the argument is a simple and intelli-
gible one.
Many defences will rely on the transferability of chattels, though. ‘I
bought it ’, says the defendant. Again there are degrees of difficulty in
such a response. ‘ I bought it from X’ is a rather easier case for the law
to settle than ‘I bought it from a man in a pub whom I didn’t know.’ In
the former case we are in the familiar territory of voucher to warranty. If
the vouchee can be found and accepts the warranty then the original de-
fendant simply drops out of the picture to be replaced by the man through
whom he claims the right. Yet even with this apparently simple process
there may be problems. The dispute must be settled; there must be
a limit to the number of hands through with the goods can have passed
before the warranty system imperils the task of dispute resolution by
submerging the instant claim in ancient history. The issue is faced by
both Welsh and English sources. In the latter it would seem that even in
Glanvill ’s time the extent of a permissible chain of warranty was still being
determined, at least insofar as the king’s court was concerned.57 One other
problem of voucher may be mentioned: the accuser has had the courage
to bring the complaint against one party, only to find him vouching
another, more difficult, opponent. In Welsh law the Llyfr y Damweiniau
poses the jurisdictional problem – what if the vouchee is in holy orders?58
In English law the well-known case of Elias Piggun involved the defend-
ant in an appeal of felony attempting to vouch the professional champion
Piggun to warranty. Since the appeal was, of course, triable by battle, the
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prosecutor faced the danger of combat with a trained fighter. Such a
clever and logical ploy on the part of the defendant could, if it had suc-
ceeded, have opened the criminal trial to the professional fighter in
much the same way as the civil settlement of writs of right had been.59 But
the prosecution of wrong has a more visceral immediacy than the pursuit
of right. The justices recognized the abuse of process (in this case at any
rate, though we cannot know how many times it was tried and succeeded)
and Piggun’s career was ended by his mutilation.60
Voucher depends on a vouchee who is known and named. The harder
question for a court to deal with is where the defendant claims to have
bought the goods from someone whom he cannot, or will not, identify.
The question is hard for the law because it is really not a legal question
at all. Its resolution depends upon a matter of proof rather than of law.
At least in voucher all the parties concerned appear before the court. In
the ‘unknown seller ’ example there is a plausible but contestable reason
for the defendant’s possession of goods. We have seen medieval custom
hardened into writing and writing worked over by professional refine-
ment, but at heart the sophistication of all medieval criminal jurispru-
dence turns into the leap of faith. In a religious age it may be entirely
sensible to trust God to reveal truth when no other proof is possible. The
alternative, however – placing faith in man rather than in God – becomes
conceptually more troublesome. We have become so used to the idea that
we can ask twelve people who have no knowledge of an event to pro-
nounce upon it that we forget what a remarkable idea that seems when it
is first being canvassed.61 However, after 1215 in English law the appeal to
God can be maintained only where accuser and accused are both before
the court and both consent to being so tried. Whilst the continuance of
trial by battle in such circumstances is often seen as an atavistic survival,
we can see that, as stated in the form just given, it is not only unexcep-
tional, but it might have seemed offensive to some medieval sensibilities to
prevent it. In Welsh law texts the primacy of compurgation as a mode of
proof overtly concentrates upon the credibility of the actor: a current
status rather than a past act. The English trial jury emerging after 1215
can only judge a defendant if that defendant specifically places himself
upon it ; in other words his fate is juridically dependent on his competence
as much as on theirs.62 I do not wish to suggest that the opinion of the
neighbourhood is something which it had any difficulty in formulating a
jury may by virtue of its proximity to the dispute be a perfectly good way
of resolving a contest over truth. The point is that medieval law is cen-
trally concerned with the establishing of circumstances and modes of
proof to be applied. But proof is not a legal issue; it is sought when law
runs out.
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Let us return to the issue of the purchase from the anonymous man in
the pub. The law can only seek to deal with this defence, which must have
been common, by regulating the conditions of sale, so as to attempt to
limit its applicability. We have noted earlier the rules relating to animal
sales, which would have touched particularly valuable transactions. In
Bracton’s treatment of theft the author allows that if the goods were
purchased in an open sale then the defendant, ex hypothesi a victim of
the thief himself, need do no more than restore the item to its original
owner.63 The law, faced inescapably with a judgement of Solomon, backs
the prior possessor.
One other practical claim may be made by the defendant in a case of
theft. ‘ I got the goods’, he says, ‘ from the claimant himself, and hold
them rightfully on that account. ’ This is either a very simple dispute (the
claimant denying the transaction64) or potentially a very complex one,
involving questions of respective rights in bailment. This latter is a com-
plex business and one which involves a concept (property) over which
much lawyers’ ink will be spilt, rather than only an issue of proof. A
consideration of this lawyers’ law is not my purpose here, yet disputes
involving such claims are likely to be early and natural grievances over
moveables.
IDENT IFY ING THE V ICT IM
Let us conclude with a basic tension within the law of theft, to which we
have alluded earlier. Theft is an offence both against an individual and
against the trust upon which community depends. It challenges both pri-
vate right and public order, an offence – as it comes to be formulated –
against both the owner and the king. The individual victim, though he
may indeed want revenge, may have as his primary purpose the recovery
of his goods or their equivalent in his pursuit of the thief. On the other
hand a royal policy of maintenance of social control may insist on pun-
ishment.65 We have seen that in England execution was at first a right and
then a duty of those who took thieves in the act. In later Saxon law, urged
Goebel, ‘ the adult thief now suffers death and forfeiture, irrespective of
how he is taken or convicted’. Wormald sees Aethelstan’s introduction of
the death penalty for all thieves, however taken, as part of a war against
theft which had become ‘almost an obsession’ for that king.66 Similar
apparently unqualified prescriptions of punishment appear in Cnut’s
code. It may be that we should not take the purport of these laws at face
value, for I have suggested above in relation to the Assizes of Clarendon
and Northampton that it is not necessary to read a law which tells us
what should be done with ‘thieves’ as necessarily meaning by that word
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‘anyone who has committed a single act of theft ’. Yet even if we do then
they certainly never reflected an inflexible social practice. The problem of
making theft subject to afflictive punishment is that the ‘prosecutor ’ may
not desire this.67 The absolute nature of the death penalty may par-
ticularly focus the mind along these lines but other penalties such as
mutilation or enslavement are not immune from this consideration.
We know certainly that thieves might be killed. In the twelfth century,
for example, we are assured that Ralph Bassett hanged 44 in one place.68
We know from this case too (for he had another six blinded and castrated)
that they might be mutilated, and a number of sources, including the
medieval hagiographical trope of miraculous organ regeneration, confirm
the plausibility of the infliction of this penalty at particular times.69 We
should not believe, however, that loss of life or member was an inevitable
consequence of a conviction for theft, even when the law suggests this, still
less a consequence of its discovery.70
Of course the law itself allowed some flexibility, as was inevitable in
an offence which covered such a range of behaviour. The mitigating effects
of youth might be acknowledged.71 Even apart from that, both English
and Welsh law recognized that not all thieves merited the full rigour of
the law. An easy way to draw the line was to restrict the harshest penalties
to those (more accurately, given my earlier comments, to some of those)
whose booty exceeded a certain monetary value.72 Such an arbitrary
boundary invites manipulation. On the one hand, we find in a well-known
twelfth-century case people bringing additional goods to put in with
those taken on the person of the accused to push the crime over the limit.73
On the other, the idea (familiar to historians of later periods) of under-
valuing stolen goods to render the offence less serious has, I think, early
origins.74 Certainly by the thirteenth century imprisonment, lesser cor-
poral punishment, or (in Summerson’s admirable phase) principles of
‘publicity and exclusion’ were the most that petty thieves, or those whose
personalities or offences were found to merit their treatment as such, had
to fear.75
We have lost the victim in this. What of his claim to recover the stolen
goods? The angyld of Anglo-Saxon law and the dirwy of Welsh law are
early financial recognitions of the pursuer’s own interest in theft. In
English law the punitive and restitutory elements of the theft action begin
to be driven apart by the question of jurisdiction. The process will not
be traced here,76 but some observations are in order. We must not assume
that because common lawyers came increasingly to see the ‘civil ’ action
of trespass and the ‘criminal ’ prosecution of appeal of felony as concep-
tually distinct that other people did so too, or at least did so at the same
rate. Nor must we assume that because the law provides a means of
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resolving a dispute that those means will in fact be used in resolving
that dispute. We must recognize another feature of recourse to law which
it is easy to overlook if our gaze is permanently turned only to the law
in books, namely its instrumental value. We have argued earlier that
methods of negotiated settlement between parties in a case of theft long
survive the desuetude of the compensation tables. It seems clear that even
when the King’s courts are driving a wedge between the notions of ‘civil ’
and ‘criminal ’ the victim of theft would use the law to get what he wanted
from the process irrespective of the conceptual distinction.77 An appeal of
felony may be started and then dropped, either entirely or in respect of
the felonious allegation, in an attempt to put pressure on a defendant to
come to terms with his victim. Here law is being used as an alternative or
an addition to other more diffuse social pressures to bring the malefactor
to settlement. It may be a particularly important tool for the poor victim,
for whom the accident of the coincidence of the king’s condemnation of
thieves may be the only lever he has to gain his own goal – the restitution
of goods and/or a financial or other settlement. The criminal law is being
used in such cases as a means of applying pressure. Royal judges, it would
seem, began to take offence at this distortion of legal process. It became
increasingly condemned as royal courts began to provide their own (more
expensive) ‘civil ’ means of gaining restitution through the writ of trespass
within the thirteenth century.78 A stricter judicial policy towards settle-
ment seems to have discouraged the use of appeals in cases of theft as well
as in other offences.79 But victims of crime know what they want and they
know how to get it. They will bring a ‘criminal ’ prosecution to produce
a ‘civil ’ remedy if they think it will benefit them. Practical rather than
conceptual arguments are likely to determine directly their actions.
I hope that this discussion will have offered a rather different approach
to looking at medieval theft law than is usual. It certainly makes no claim
to be a complete, or even a particularly detailed, discussion of the law of
theft. Nor, as I have said, despite its invocation of both English andWelsh
law, is its intention a comparative one. I have tried to undertake a func-
tional analysis of the problems to which an act of theft may give rise. The
law is then seen to arise from them, not them from the law, although law
itself then creates, and does not simply respond to, social conditions.
From this perspective, continuity across time and similarity between jur-
isdictions seem predictable rather than exceptional, and difference in the
regulation of such basic forms of conduct seems more interesting as an
avenue of investigation. I hope the reader will have found some of the
observations presented here to be rather obvious. That is, in a sense, the
point. It is easy for the medieval legal historian entranced by the com-




This article developed from a paper given to the Seminar Cyfraith Hywel in Aberystwyth in
March 2001. I am grateful to all who have made comments upon it, then and subsequently.
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earlier ones for ideological reasons (on which see for example D. A. Binchy, ‘The
linguistic and historical value of the Irish law tracts’ Proceedings of the British Academy
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recognized as a corrective to an asumption that England at that time was analogous
to the ‘stateless societies ’ which have been studied by anthropologists. I do not doubt
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must not swing too far. As I have indicated earlier, the state is not the only relevant
community (even if it thinks it is !) in which a dispute is located, nor are its own norms
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with the law of theft. As I hope will become clear, my argument is not that these laws
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practical issues which, I argue, necessarily must arise in disputes over the taking of
property. As representing the law as actually applied they must remain only, in Wor-
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21 Miller, Bloodtaking and peacemaking, 228.
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and love in the middle ages’, in J. Bossy ed., Disputes and settlements (Cambridge,
1983), Reynolds, Kingdoms and communities, Ch. 2, and Davies and Fouracre, Settle-
ment of disputes, 238. It is with these broad continuities not the precise modalities of
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53 See, for example, Wormald, ‘Frederic William Maitland’, 54 et seq.
54 Note in this respect the later rules relating to the appeal of felony which allow a dis-
continued appeal of felony to be prosecuted ‘at the King’s suit ’. One reason for such
discontinuance, to be discussed shortly, is of course compromise. We will see a de-
veloping royal hostility to this persistent practice. See on this the discussion in
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